Abstract
Introduction
Malicious users can easily steal confidential documents and anyone's privacy by sniffing a network. It can be done simply by downloading a free Sniffer software from the Internet and installing it into a personal computer (PC). Sniffers capture all packets in a network. To achieve this, the Sniffer sets the Network Interface Card (NIC) of the computer into a mode called "promiscuous mode". Then the NIC will blindly receive all packets and pass them to the system kernel. Packets that are not supposed to arrive to that PC are no longer blocked by the NIC.
Many basics services, such as FTP, Telnet and SMTP [9] , send clear text data in the packets. A Sniffer captures all packets and displays their contents on the hacker's computer screen, for examples the passwords used to authenticate during an FTP session, or the message of an email in SMTP packets. Hackers can spy the users of a network, just by reading and analyzing the contents of the packets going to and out of the users' hosts. This type of attack on a network is usually difficult to detect, since it does not interfere with the network traffic at all. System administrators are facing difficulties to detect and deal with this attack.
In this paper, we explores two different techniques which can be used to detect the hosts running Sniffers in an Ethernet network. The two techniques are: "The ARP detection" and "the RTT detection". The ARP detection technique sends first to a suspicious host, trap ARP request packets with fake hardware addresses. Based on the generated responses (ARP reply packets) and the operating system (OS) of the suspicious host, a decision is made on whether or not the suspicious host is running a Sniffer. The RTT detection technique uses samples of RTT measurements of ICMP packets, and a statistical model (the z-statistics) to make a probabilistic decision. The two techniques are implemented in two tools that automatically give system administrators a helping hand regarding the detection of Sniffers on an Ethernet network.
NIC's hardware addresses
All the NIC's on the Ethernet are represented by a 6-byte hardware address. The manufacturer assigns this address such that each address is unique in the whole world. Theoretically, there are no two NIC's having the same hardware address. All communications on the Ethernet are based on this hardware address. The NIC, however, can set up different filters (called hardware filter) in order to receive different kinds of packets. The following are a list of hardware filters: 
ARP detection technique
The ARP detection technique consist into checking whether or not a suspicious host responds to ARP request packets that are not supposed to be treated by the suspicious host. Since the sniffing host receives all the packets, including those that are not targeting to it, it may make mistakes such as responding to a packet, which originally is supposed to be filtered by the host's NIC. Therefore, the detection is performed by checking the responses of ARP reply packets, when ARP request packets are sent to all hosts on the network.
On an Ethernet linked by IP addresses, packets are in fact sent and received based on hardware addresses (MAC address). Packets cannot be sent by just using an IP address. Therefore, the Ethernet needs a mechanism that converts IP addresses into hardware addresses. At this time, ARP packets are used. ARP packets belong to the link layer, which is the same layer as IP, so ARP packets does not affect the IP layer. Since IP addresses resolving is always available on an IP network, ARP packets become the suitable packets for testing the response of the hosts when detecting promiscuous mode.
Promiscuous mode detection
When the NIC is set to promiscuous mode, packets that are supposed to be filtered by the NIC are now passed to the system kernel. Therefore, if we configure an ARP packet such that it does not have broadcast address as the destination address, send it to every host on the network and discover that some hosts respond to it, then those hosts are set to the promiscuous mode.
In this example, the ARP packet destination hardware address is set to an address that does not exist, for example 00-00-00-00-00-01. When the NIC is in normal mode, this packet is considered to be "to other host" packet, so it is refused by the hardware filter of the NIC. However, when the NIC is in promiscuous mode, the NIC does not perform any filter operation. Then this packet is able to pass to the system kernel. The system kernel assumes that this ARP requests packet arrives because it contains the same IP address as that machine, so it should respond to the packet. However, this is not true. There exists some sort of software filter in the kernel, called the Software Filter, because a packet is actually filtered again by the system kernel. The software filter depends on the operating system kernel. This address is a fake broadcast address missing the last 1 bit. This is to check whether the software filter examines all bits of the address and whether it will respond.
¾ FF:FF:00:00:00:00 fake broadcast 16 bits (B16):
This address is a fake broadcast address in which only the first 16 bits are the same as the broadcast address. This may be classified as a broadcast address and replied when the filter function only checks the first word of the broadcast address. ¾ FF:00:00:00:00:00 fake broadcast 8 bits (B8): This address is a fake broadcast address in which only the first 8 bits are the same as the broadcast address. This may be classified as a broadcast address and replied when the filter function only checks the first byte of the broadcast address. ¾ F0:00:00:00:00:00 fake broadcast 4 bits (B4) : This address is a fake broadcast address in which only the first 4 bits are the same as the broadcast address. This may be classified as a broadcast address and replied when the filter function only checks the first 4 bits of the broadcast address. ¾ 01:00:00:00:00:00 group bit address (Gr): This is an address with only the group bit set. This is to check whether this address is considered as a multicast address as Linux does. ¾ 01:00:5E:00:00:00 multicast address 0 (M0):
Multicast address 0 is usually not used. So we use this as an example of a multicast address not registered in the multicast list of the NIC. The hardware filter should reject this packet. However, this packet may be misclassified to be a multicast address when the software filter does not completely check all bits. The system kernel thus may reply to such packet when the NIC is set to promiscuous mode. ¾ 01:00:5E:00:00:01 multicast address 1 (M1):
Multicast address 1 is an address that all hosts in the local network should receive. In the other word, the hardware filter will pass this kind of packets by default. But it is possible that the NIC does not support multicast mode and does not respond, but this hypothesis was not available because all the available cards on the market bear multicasting. So this is to check whether the host supports multicast addresses. ¾ 01:00:5E:00:00:02 multicast address 2 (M2):
Multicast address 2 is used to all routers in the local networks. So we use this as an example of a multicast address not registered in the multicast list of the NIC. The hardware filter should reject this packet and also is not accepted by the software filter. The system kernel check the hardware result and one notices while the software filter always comes after the hardware filter, from which for the addresses multicast, if an address was rejected by the hardware filter she is therefore rejected by the software filter.
¾ 01:00:5E:00:00:03 multicast address 3 (M3):
Multicast address 3 is not assigned. So we use this as an example of a multicast address not registered in the multicast list of the NIC. The hardware filter should reject this packet and also is not accepted by the software filter. The system kernel check the hardware result and one notices while the software filter always comes after the hardware filter, from which for the addresses multicast, if an address was rejected by the hardware filter she is therefore rejected by the software filter.
Experiences and results.
The tests are performed against a number of operating systems (Windows 9x, ME, 2000/NT and XP, Linux 2.4x and FreeBSD 5.0). As expected, all kernels respond to the broadcast address and multicast address 1 when the NIC is in normal mode. The test results using the hardware addresses listed in the previous section, are listed in Table 1 . However, when the NIC is set to the promiscuous mode, the results are OS dependent.
Microsoft Windows :
¾ In the case of Windows 9x and ME, it responds to fake broadcast addresses B47, B16, and B8. Hence, the software filters of Windows 9x and Me determine the broadcast address by checking only the first byte. Because when we test with fake address F0:00:00:00:00:00, it will not respond, so the mechanism of check, try to check only FF:??:??:??:??:??. Therefore, the three addresses B47, B16 and B8 can be used to verify whether a NIC card is set to a promiscuous mode or not. If the NIC is in the promiscuous mode, it will responds to an ARP request packet, by an ARP reply packet. ¾ In the case of Windows 2000/NT, it responds to fake broadcast B47 and B16. Hence, the software filters of Windows 2000/NT determine the broadcast address by checking only the first two bytes. Since Windows 2000/NT responds to the fake broadcast B16 in the normal mode also, therefore, only the addresses B47 can be used to verify whether a NIC card is set to a promiscuous mode or not. ¾ In the case of Windows XP, it responds to fake broadcast addresses B47 and B16. Hence, the software filter of Windows XP determines the broadcast address by checking only the first two bytes. Therefore, the two fake broadcast addresses B47 and B16 can be used to verify whether a NIC card is set to a promiscuous mode or not.
Linux and FreeBSD :
¾ In the case of Linux 2.4x and FreeBSD 5.0, it responds to all fake broadcast and to all addresses with the group bit set. Therefore, any fake broadcast addresses can be used to verify the promiscuous mode. In addition, any address with the group bit set can be used to verify the promiscuous mode, excluding the multicast address M1. Since, Multicast address M1 is an address that all hosts in the local network should receive. 
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RTT detection technique
The RTT (Round Trip Time) is the time of the round trip of a packet sent to a host. That is the time that a packet took to reach the destination, plus the time that a response took to reach the source. It is expected that the measurement of the RTT increases considerably when a host is in the promiscuous mode, since all packets are captured.
The idea behind the RTT detection technique, is first to collect a training data. This is done by first sending to a host set to the normal mode and with a particular OS, a number of request packets, and wait for the responses packets, in order to take the RTT measurements. The host then is set to the promiscuous mode. And, the same request packets are sent again to the host, and the corresponding RTT measurements are collected. The RTT averages, the standard deviations, and the percentage of changes of the collected RTT measurements are computed. The RTT averages, standard deviations, percentage of changes are called the training data.
The samples of the collected RTT measurements represent two different populations, called the normal mode population and the promiscuous mode population. To show that the two averages of the samples RTT measurements are statistically different enough and therefore represent two different populations (the normal mode and the promiscuous mode populations), the zstatistics model is used. The z-statistics model allows to make a judgment about whether or not a host's NIC is set to the promiscuous mode.
In the real world, the system administrator has to identify first the OS of the suspicious host. This can be done by several available tools, such as Nmap [15] . Then, a number of request packets should be sent to the suspicious host in order to collect the corresponding RTT measurements.
So far, the suspicious host can be either in the normal mode or in the promiscuous mode. Two z-statistics are computed. The first one, called the normal mode zstatistics, uses the training data related to the OS of the suspicious host for the normal mode, as the first population, and the collected data in the real world, as the second population. The second z-statistics, called the promiscuous mode z-statistics, uses the training data related to the OS of the suspicious host for the promiscuous mode, as the first population, and the collected data, as the second population. If the normal mode z-statistics is less than the z value (which is 2.36), then we may conclude that the host's NIC is almost 99% set to the normal mode, else, the host's NIC is set to the promiscuous mode. The Figure 1 shows this decision making process. 
The z-Statistics test principle
Consider two populations of round trip time (RTT), with population averages µ 1 and µ 2 , respectively (µ 1 and µ 2 are both unknown because the two populations are infinite).
Let µ = µ 1 -µ 2 be the difference between the two population averages. We would like to test the null hypothesis that µ = 0 against the alternative hypothesis that µ > 0 Suppose we draw a random sample of size n 1 with replacement from the first population, and independently draw a random sample of size n 2 with replacement from the second population. Let X is µ 2 , the expected value of their difference is
Because the two random samples are independent, M 1 and -M 2 are independent random variables, and the standard error of their sum is
Let S 1 and S 2 be the sample standard deviations of the two samples, respectively.
If n 1 and n 2 are both very large, the two sample standard deviations are quite likely to be close to the standard deviations of the two populations, and so S 1 /n 1 ½ is likely to be close to SE( 1 X ) and S 2 /n 2 ½ is likely to be close to SE( 2 X ).
Therefore,
½ is likely to be close to SE( X ). Under the null hypothesis, the statistic
½ has zero expected value, and its probability histogram is approximated well by the normal curve, so we can use it as the Z statistic in a z test. Under the alternative hypothesis µ = µ 1 -µ 2 >0, the expected value of Z is greater than zero, so it is appropriate to use a right-tail z test which rejects the null hypothesis at approximate significance level p whenever Z > z 100% -p. For example, in the Figure 2 , when the z value is 2.36, we will reject the null hypothesis at approximate significance level p = 1%.
Figure 2. Standard normal curve

Training data
For the training data, five operating systems have been targeted, namely: Windows XP, Windows Me/9x, Windows 2K/NT, Linux 2.4.x and FreeBSD 5.0. To implement the request and wait for a reply mechanism, we use ICMP [7] request packets which would normally generate ICMP reply packets. Such replies allow to determine the values of the RTT.
For each operating system, we took two measurements of the RTT, as follow:
¾ The first measurements of the RTT are taken when the hosts are in the normal mode. ¾ The second measurements of the RTT are taken when the hosts are in the promiscuous mode. We sent 130 ICMP request packets and we waited for the replies. Then, we calculated the RTT average, the standard deviation, the percentage of change and the ZStatistics. The results of experience are shown in Table 2 . shows that the percentage of change between the normal mode and the promiscuous mode is significant. This demonstrates that the promiscuous mode has considerable effect on the RTT measurements. In addition, Table 2 shows that the z-statistics for all five OSs is greater than the Z value of 2.36. Therefore, based on the z-statistics test, we are almost close to 99% sure that the two collected RTT measurements represent to different populations, which are the normal mode population and the promiscuous mode population.
Experimental tests
To test the proposed technique, we realized the following experience using two hosts running Linux 2.4.19 and Windows Me, respectively. First, for each OS, a sample RTT measurements are collected. Using the training data presented in Table 2 , for each OS and the new collected data, two z-statistics are computed. The first one, called the Normal mode z-statistics, is computed using the training data when the host is in the normal mode and the new collected data. These are the two populations. The second, called the Promiscuous mode zstatistics, is computed using the training data when the host is in the promiscuous mode and the collected data. If the value of the Normal mode z-statistics is smaller than the value of the Promiscuous mode Z-Statistics, and less than the z value 2.36 then the suspicious host is almost 99% not running a Sniffer, else it is likely running a Sniffer.
The results of the experience is shown in the following two tables: 
Discussion
Other techniques presented at [13] , such as the Load detection technique, and the DNS detection technique. The Load technique consists into taken the RTT measurements of an FTP connexion, under normal traffic and heavy traffic. When the suspicious host is in the promiscuous mode and under heavy traffic, the RTT measurements will increase significantly. This technique has some drawbacks. First, the suspicious host must has an open FTP port (21 port). However, in a network, it is not common to have always an FTP open port in each machine. Second, to work appropriately, this technique needs to send heavy traffic on the network. This action may cause some damage to the network's performance, such as a denial of service.
The DNS technique discussed at [13, 14] is based on the reverse DNS lookup generated by the Sniffer running on the suspicious host. However, professional hackers can configure their Sniffers so that the Sniffers do not perform any reverse DNS lookup. Consequently, the DNS technique becomes ineffective.
However, the RTT detection technique presented in this paper, works with ICMP packets. Since most TCP/IP stacks handle the ICMP echo packets as soon as it is received from the network, therefore the RTT measurements of ICMP packets are not affected considerably by heavy traffic on the network. This makes our proposed RTT detection technique more efficient and robust than the others.
It is important to mention that the RTT measurements of ICMP packets can mislead, since the response time of ICMP packets are not stable (some RTT values are very high than the other samples values). To deal with this situation, our proposed technique uses the sample standard deviation of the collected RTT values, which would indicate whether or not there are some RTT values that are higher than the RTT average. If yes, our RTT detection technique rejects the collected data, and repeats the data collection process.
As future works, an integrated tool that integrate the two proposed techniques, the ARP detection and the RTT detection techniques, would be very useful for systems administrators. In addition, such a tool should be able to detect automatically the OS of a suspicious host. The ARP detection technique can be used as a technique for remote OS detection of a given host, since each OS generates particular responses when fake ARP packets are received (see Table 1 ).
Conclusion
Today, the need for techniques and tools to detect sniffing activities on a network is unquestionable. Hackers do not need advanced knowledge about TCP/IP protocols, or networking to sniff a network. Hackers are just downloading Sniffers from the Internet, and using them to spy their target networks, and stealing confidential information.
In this paper, we presented two techniques which are effective in detecting Sniffers running on remote hosts. Even though Sniffers are difficult to detect, the two techniques can provide system administrator with a consistent decision.
The ARP detection technique is more stable and more accurate than the RTT detection technique. The RTT detection technique is based on a statistical model, in addition, it generates traffic on the network in order to take the RTT measurements, an action that may degrade the network's performance. However, by combining the two techniques in a single automated tool, systems administrators will have more results that confirm whether or not a target host is set to the promiscuous mode.
